Link: The Battle of Cape Esperance, Naval Historical Center, Washington, 1994.

FC4-12/A16-3

    1.   In the evening of 11 October Task Group 64.2 was steaming on course 000° true at 28 knots. Word had been received from Group Commander that his intentions were to intercept enemy force of 2 heavy cruisers and 6 destroyers which air reconnaissance had reported approaching Northwest coast of Guadalcanal from the Northwest with the assumed objective of landing troops. Our cruisers, SAN FRANCISCO, HELENA, SALT LAKE CITY, and BOISE were in column with destroyer, FARENHOLT, DUNCAN, LAFFEY, and McCALLA disposed in screen on 4000 yard circle. The BUCHANAN, who had left formation in late afternoon to rescue cruiser aircraft personnel, rejoined and took station in screen at 2211. This force was approaching Savo Island from the South. Zone - 22 time was in use, moderate sea, wind Easterly about 12 knots, night dark and overcast. The Squadron Commander was embarked in FARENHOLT, Squadron Flagship.

    2.   The following is a chronological sequence of events:

        (a) At 2145 slowed to 25 knots.

        (b) At 2200 sighted bright yellow flare astern of formation. Cruisers were launching aircraft at this time. Formation slowed to 20 knots.

        (c) At 2200 FARENHOLT obtained radar contact bearing 345° true, distance 13,000 yards, which was assumed to be Russel Island.

        (d) At 2223 destroyers took approach disposition with FARENHOLT, DUNCAN, and LAFFEY in column in van and BUCHANAN leading McCALLA at rear of cruiser column.

        (e) At 2227 disposition changed course to 075° true.

        (f) At 2245 sighted two blue lights on beach at Northwest end of Guadalcanal which had the appearance of range lights and oriented such that they may have been intended as aids to the approaching enemy force.

        (g) At 2300 sighted Savo Island dead ahead, distance approximately six miles.

        (h) At 2308 force changed course to 050° true.

        (i) At 2332 force reverse course left to 230° true, cruisers executing column movement immediately. FARENHOLT turned to left followed by DUNCAN and LAFFEY. I gave orders to the Captain of the FARENHOLT to slow as necessary to remain astern of the cruisers until it could be ascertained whether DDs which had been in the rear were following cruisers in formation, or had turned to take new van positions. As soon as I determined that they were following astern of the cruisers, I ordered the Captain to speed up and take position ahead of the cruisers, going up on their starboard flank. Up to this time there had been no contact of enemy forces in the vicinity, and from previously reported position of enemy forces, it was estimated that they would be Southeastward of our own forces, or on cruisers port flank. DUNCAN and LAFFEY had been instructed previously to follow the course and speed of the FARENHOLT without signal.

        (j) At 2340 SAN FRANCISCO reported radar contact with surface craft, bearing 298° true, distance not given. At this time the FARENHOLT had gained position abreast of the middle of the cruiser column. As this contact was about 68° on the starboard bow of FARENHOLT, I instructed the Captain to slow, and gave consideration to turning toward cruisers and attempting to take position astern of them. Just at this time CTG 64.2 inquired if my group was taking position ahead, to which I replied, “Affirmative; coming up on your starboard flank”. This was done to acquaint all hands of our position.

        (k) At 2343 SAN FRANCISCO reported radar contact of unidentified aircraft 065° true, distance 5 miles, and another contact 284° true, no distance given. Before any action could be taken toward turning to take position astern of cruisers, fire was opened by our own forces, shells at first going over the top of this vessel, the fire being about abeam of the cruisers. Consideration was then given toward the best way to get out of this unfavorable position and decision was made to continue at best speed and pull out ahead as a turn to the left would throw us into our own cruisers and to the right into the enemy.

        (l) At 2347 order for all ships to cease firing was heard over voice radio. CTG 64.2 inquired if I was all right, reply being made in the affirmative. About 30 seconds later reported that our own units were firing on us. Fire of own units decreased in volume but continued.

        (m) At 2349 the FARENHOLT opened fire on enemy vessel, brilliantly illuminated by starshells, and orders were given to fire torpedoes at favorable targets, if any. Two vessels on the starboard hand, which appeared to be enemy heavy cruisers, were burning fiercely at this time.

        (n) At 2350 the FARENHOLT was hit on the fore yard arm and at the top of No. 2 stack. Fragments from latter hit jammed the torpedo mount amidships. At the same time or shortly thereafter, the FARENHOLT was struck at the water line on port side at Frame 65 by one or more shells. This hit put the I. C. and Plotting Room out of commission. This hit and one at water line, port side, Frame 85, disrupted all power, lighting, and communications in forward part of ship. At this time the FARENHOLT was about abreast of SAN FRANCISCO, which cruiser was apparently turning to starboard to close the enemy. After clearing, a check on the damage sustained was made. The ship had a heavy list to port.

    3.   While an attempt was being made to save the ship and to get information relative to the condition of the propulsive machinery, the second phase of the encounter occurred about three or four miles to the Westward of the FARENHOLT. Due to the FARENHOLT’s condition and that our forces were between her and the enemy, she did not enter into this phase of the battle. The FARENHOLT remained in the vicinity until about 0100, at which time it appeared that no further action would take place, then retired Southwest, later to southard [sic], to keep clear of own forces, as the only means of identification was by blinker tube.

    4.   References (a), (b), and (c), have been forwarded previously. To date no action reports have been received from FARENHOLT, McCALLA, and from Commanding Officer of DUNCAN, which ship was lost in this action.

    5.   Lessons Learned and Recommendations:

        (a) The value of vertical fighting lights was thoroughly demonstrated. However, no arrangement is made for a suitable means of identification in case fighting lights are put out of commission as occurred in FARENHOLT. It is believed that a compact auxiliary set of vertical fighting lights installed on the mainmast would be highly desirable.

        (b) The use of “Roger” for receipt of a TBS message was apparently misunderstood as an order to commence firing. It is recommended that either the signal to commence firing be changed, or the manner of receipting for TBS messages be changed in order to avoid possible misinterpretation or confusion.

        (c) In the event that destroyers are disposed both in the van and the rear of heavy ships when deployed for action, and a column movement of 120° or more is executed by the heavy ships, it is recommended that those DDs which were originally in the rear take the van position upon the execution of the change of course. This would decrease the time that the heavy ships’ fire would be masked by own DDs.

    6.   All officers and enlisted personnel who came under the observation of the Squadron Commander conducted themselves in a manner creditable to the Naval Service. No actions were noted meriting special credit.

R. G. TOBIN